Do CEOs Ever Lose? Fairness Perspective on the Allocation of Residuals Between CEOs and Shareholders by Kolev, Kalin et al.
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Management Faculty Research and Publications Management, Department of
6-1-2014
Do CEOs Ever Lose? Fairness Perspective on the
Allocation of Residuals Between CEOs and
Shareholders
Kalin Kolev
Marquette University, kalin.kolev@marquette.edu
Robert M. Wiseman
Michigan State University
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia
University of Notre Dame
Accepted version. Journal of Management, ( June 2014). DOI. © 2014 SAGE Publications. Used with
permission.
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Management, (June 4, 2014). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications. 
1 
 
 
 
Do CEOs Ever Lose?: Fairness 
Perspective on the Allocation of 
Residuals Between CEOs and 
Shareholders 
 
Kalin Kolev 
Department of Management 
College of Business Administration 
Marquette University 
Milwaukee, WI 
Robert M. Wiseman 
Management Department 
Eli Broad College of Business 
Michigan State University 
East Lansing, MI 
Luis R. Gomez-Mejia 
Management Department 
Mendoza College of Business 
University of Notre Dame 
Notre Dame, IN 
 
 
 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Management, (June 4, 2014). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications. 
2 
 
Abstract 
In this study we introduce a justice perspective to examining the result 
of bargaining between CEOs and boards over the allocation of firm residuals 
that ultimately determines CEO compensation. Framing CEO pay as the result 
of bargaining between CEOs and boards focuses attention on the power of 
CEOs to increase their share of firm residuals in the form of increased 
compensation, and the diligence of boards of directors to constrain CEO 
opportunism. Framing this negotiation through a theory of justice offers an 
alternative perspective to the search for pay-performance sensitivity. We 
predict and find that as board diligence in controlling opportunism declines 
and CEO power increases, CEOs are increasingly able to capture a larger 
portion of firm residuals relative to shareholders. This finding supports critics 
who charge that CEO pay violates norms of distributive and procedural 
justice.  
Keywords: CEO compensation, agency theory, board monitoring, 
distributive justice 
Following agency theory prescriptions for controlling agency 
opportunism (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), 
corporate America increasingly adopted pay schemes that linked a 
portion of agent compensation to outcomes important to principals. 
For example, virtually 100% of CEOs’ pay today includes some form of 
performance contingent pay. This widespread use of contingent pay 
has provoked a large escalation in the use of equity forms of 
compensation (particularly restricted stock and stock options) over the 
past 25 years. The use of equity forms of compensation was thought 
to tie executive pay more closely to shareholder wealth and led to 
hundreds of studies attempting to measure this link, generally known 
as pay-performance sensitivity (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997).  
Corresponding to the increased reliance on equity-based pay is 
a greater increase in the amount of compensation awarded to senior 
executives, especially CEOs. For example, average CEO compensation 
rose as much as 614% in real dollars between 1980 and 2004 
compared to a 7% rise in average worker pay over the same period 
(Bogle, 2008). Others have also noted extraordinary rise in CEO 
compensation in recent years, most of it due to increases in equity pay 
(Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005; Frydman & Saks, 2010; Walsh, 2008). 
This rise in pay has not gone unnoticed by the media, who question 
the size of CEO pay packages by noting the growing disparity between 
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CEO pay and that of other segments of society (Deutsch, 2008; 
Morgenson, 2013). While agency theory provides a strong foundation 
for describing the challenges of controlling agent opportunism, its 
normative views of agent opportunism has left us mired in an endless 
debate of when or if opportunism is occurring, hindering our ability to 
control it.  
The focus on pay-performance sensitivity as a solution to agent 
opportunism has brought forth a debate between defenders (Core & 
Guay, 2010; Kaplan, 2008) and critics (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Walsh, 
2008) of senior executive compensation practices. Critics charge that 
CEO pay is excessive and continues to rise faster than GDP and 
average worker wages, making it difficult to justify on economic 
grounds (Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005; Frydman & Saks, 2010), and cite 
the poor record of research into pay-performance sensitivity (e.g., 
Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Defenders argue that CEO 
pay satisfies demands of market efficiency because it coincides with 
changes in shareholder value (Core & Guay, 2010; Kaplan, 2008; 
Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010) and reflects increases in 
the contribution wage needed to compensate for increasing risk and 
job complexity. Despite more than 1,200 articles published on the 
subject (Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, & Franco-Santos, 2010), the lack of 
agreement on the appropriateness of CEO pay along with the absence 
of consistent empirical support for its effectiveness in producing 
shareholder value has led to a stalemate in the debate over executive 
pay.  
Writing from an economics perspective almost 30 years ago, 
Eccles (1985: 52) drew from anecdotal evidence to conclude that “the 
problem of fairness—never considered in the literature on agency 
relationships—was frequently mentioned as an essential aspect of such 
relationships.” An absence of rigorous treatment of this issue still 
remains true today. This is surprising because, while not made explicit, 
a concern for fairness underlies much of the controversy surrounding 
CEO pay as reflected in such comments as “top executives are worth 
every nickel they get” (Murphy, 1986: 125) and “the research 
evidence to date strongly supports the conclusion that executives use 
incentive compensation in ways that benefit themselves at the 
expense of shareholders” (Devers, Cannella, Reilly, & Yoder, 2007: 
1028). Ironically a large literature on organizational justice has grown 
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parallel to the agency literature, even though both literatures deal with 
the allocation of rewards and the extent to which those rewards are 
deserved. True to its origin and tradition, much of the CEO pay 
literature continues to be embedded within an agency framework, 
ignoring the insights of organizational justice scholars.  
This study offers a novel interpretation of CEO pay from a 
deservingness perspective by drawing on both agency and 
organizational justice models. This combined theoretical lens enhances 
our understanding of CEO pay by going beyond measuring how closely 
changes in CEO pay correspond to changes in shareholder wealth to 
considering the allocation of firm residuals between shareholders and 
CEOs (i.e., whether the allocation conforms to normative views of 
distributive justice) and the enabling conditions that may allow this to 
occur (i.e., whether the allocation of residuals satisfies the normative 
rules of procedural justice). This is an important issue at a societal 
level because a sense of deep unfairness may give rise to widespread 
cynicism about corporate governance if top ranks appear to benefit 
from gaming the system (Loomis, 2009). Reflecting this view a few 
years ago, President Obama referred to executive pay, particularly in 
the financial industry, as “immoral.” From a more objective 
perspective, both justice dimensions have been found to predict a wide 
array of psychological constructs, such as satisfaction with leaders 
(Tyler & Caine, 1981), acceptability of reward allocation decisions 
(Lissak, 1983), motivation of subordinates (St. Onge, 1993), and 
commitment to the firm (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990). Thus, normative 
views of justice would seem important considerations in determining 
the allocation of residuals between agents and principals.  
In our view, debating the optimality of CEO pay misses a larger 
and more significant concern over whether CEO pay violates normative 
views of distributive justice. That is, does agent rent seeking result in 
distortions to the allocation of firm residuals among firm stakeholders? 
Empirically, prior research has largely focused on whether the 
coefficient linking pay to firm performance in models of pay-
performance sensitivity is positive and significant, largely ignoring the 
intercept that reflects the proportion of residuals captured by the CEO. 
Thus, while annual fluctuations in CEO pay may have exhibited a 
modest association with fluctuations in firm performance, the overall 
size of CEO pay has risen relative to a variety of economic factors 
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(e.g., inflation, GDP, and average wage scales). Recognizing this issue, 
Kirkland and Burke (2006) quote a Forbes story on CEO pay: “What’s 
at stake, in short, is nothing less than the public trust essential to a 
thriving free-market economy.” Echoing this view, Walsh (2008: 30) 
notes that “public concern about executive pay is not about the nature 
of pay/performance sensitivities, nor is it about envy . . . [it] is about 
fairness.” Given the outcry over CEO pay, it is important to determine 
if CEO pay violates norms of distributive justice. Though Wirtz (2006: 
23) laments that “you’ll find no such estimates in the literature,” we 
suggest that examining the allocation of firm residuals between CEOs 
as agents and shareholders as principals provides the estimate Wirtz is 
seeking.  
To address this shortcoming we focus on the question of 
whether and under what conditions CEOs are able to capture more 
returns than shareholders, who presumably have primacy rights to 
firm residuals (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In particular, we suggest that CEOs are 
able to extract greater returns than shareholders even after controlling 
for reservation wages paid to CEOs. Furthermore, under certain 
governance conditions, we find that agents are able to capture even 
larger returns when measured against shareholder returns signaling 
that CEO rent seeking is more aggressive when boards are less 
effective. We offer a fresh new way of conceptualizing and measuring 
CEO rent seeking which traditionally has been interpreted in terms of 
agent pay-performance sensitivity. More specifically, we use a residual 
analysis to ascertain the extent to which CEOs receive returns from 
equity forms of pay beyond what can be explained by shareholder 
returns. In essence, we compare the returns realized by CEOs to those 
realized by shareholders, to determine if CEOs are capturing a larger 
share of firm residuals relative to shareholders. We suggest that 
allocations of firm residuals that favor CEOs over shareholders would 
seem to violate normative views of distributive justice given that 
classical agency writings and most financial economists posit the latter 
as holding primary claimant rights to the firm’s residuals (e.g., Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). Comparing CEO returns 
to shareholder returns has implications for the distribution of firm 
value among all stakeholders that several have suggested may 
negatively impact the willingness of others to participate in the firm’s 
value creation efforts (Kirkland & Burke, 2006; Walsh, 2008; Wirtz, 
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2006). In sum, our approach is to break free of theories that fail to 
provide justification for controlling agent opportunism and introduce a 
justice perspective that compares CEO compensation relative to a key 
constituent of the firm, its shareholders.  
Full understanding of how CEOs may extract excess returns 
requires that we also consider the context in which firm residuals are 
allocated between shareholders and executives. Consistent with our 
hybrid agency-justice theoretical perspective, we recognize conditions 
that may exacerbate or constrain the ability of CEOs to capture larger 
returns at the expense of shareholders. This hybrid perspective breaks 
free from research that has focused largely on the CEO’s pay-
performance sensitivity. Thus, we recognize that boards of directors, 
as shareholders’ representatives, play an important role in designing 
and administering executive pay and ensuring against agent 
opportunism. However, one finds a quagmire similar to that of the 
pay-performance sensitivity research when it comes to examinations 
of the effectiveness of boards of directors. While some scholars find 
evidence that increased board monitoring garners positive stock 
market reactions, higher bond ratings, and widespread support in the 
financial community (Bhojraj & Sengupta, 2003), others find either no 
effect (see the meta-analysis by Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998) or worse, a negative board impact on shareholders welfare 
because through window dressing, impression management, and 
symbolism decoupled from substantive actions, the appearance of 
strong board monitoring can promote the self-serving agenda of 
powerful CEOs (Westphal & Graebner, 2010; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 
1998). The resulting confusion that emerges in this literature may be 
due partly to a failure to fully appreciate the complex nature of 
boards; while boards have traditionally been looked at through the 
lens of structural independence, the idea of board diligence has 
received less attention. Given that CEO pay is the result of a 
negotiation between the CEO and the board, understanding how agent 
opportunism is controlled or countenanced requires that we look more 
closely at board diligence.  
Essentially, we find that on average CEO returns exceed the 
returns of shareholders who purportedly represent the firm’s primary 
residual claimants (cf. Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hansmann & Kraakman, 
2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), strongly suggesting a lack of 
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distributive justice in the allocation of residuals. While there might be 
disagreement as to the optimal or even reasonable allocation of firm 
residuals between principals and agents, one suspects that CEO 
returns that consistently supersede shareholder returns over the 
business cycle, even after controlling for the CEO’s reservation wages, 
represent an agency cost, especially if CEOs simultaneously can 
insulate themselves from risk.  
This article contributes to existing research in several ways. 
First, we link agency theory to organizational justice theory, creating a 
powerful interdisciplinary model that can be used to study pay 
deservingness at the top executive rank, a construct that is central to 
the legitimacy of any incentive system. Second, we argue and find 
support that CEO returns in excess of shareholder returns are partly 
explained ironically by the use of performance-contingent pay intended 
to align CEO interests with those of shareholders. That is, agency 
prescriptions suggested for controlling CEO opportunism by tying a 
portion of CEO pay to the performance of the firm’s stock (and thus 
shareholder wealth) may be partly responsible for the breakdown in 
alignment between CEO pay and firm performance resulting in a 
violation of normative views of distributive justice. This contrasts with 
the normative views underlying pay-performance sensitivity research 
that views CEO pay as acceptable if it corresponds to fluctuations in 
firm performance. Third, we outline the factors that facilitate or 
constrain CEOs from capturing excess returns and that undermine the 
control of agent rent seeking. In other words, we theorize on the 
factors that tilt the balance of power between CEOs and shareholders 
when contingent forms of pay such as stock options are supposed to 
control agent opportunism. Thus, we enhance traditional approaches 
to board monitoring by focusing on often overlooked dimensions that 
are critical for constraining agent opportunism, and which raise issues 
of procedural justice in how firm residuals are allocated through the 
negotiation of CEO pay. Finally, we take a different approach to 
studying the control of agent opportunism by proposing an innovative 
method of examining the relative distribution of firm residuals between 
CEOs and shareholders.  
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Among publically traded firms where ownership is separated 
from control, CEOs are hired to formulate and implement strategies 
that will generate profits and earn positive rents for shareholders. To 
overcome CEO shirking and motivate CEOs to be diligent guardians of 
shareholder wealth, principals purportedly design compensation 
contracts where a sizeable part of CEO pay is linked to firm 
performance. In theory this is intended to create alignment in the 
interests of CEOs and shareholders over the creation of shareholder 
value. Embedded in prescriptions for creating incentive alignment is 
the shared belief that maximizing shareholder value by limiting agent 
rent seeking is the principal goal of corporate governance (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). In practice, empirical evidence of this alignment is 
scant (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Tosi et al., 2000). Empirical 
examinations of pay-performance sensitivity find at best weak and 
often inconsistent associations between CEO pay and firm 
performance. Thus, while increased use of equity-based pay would 
seem to ensure a link between CEO incentives and shareholder value 
creation, such a link has yet to materialize in any consistent way. 
Meanwhile, CEO pay has risen, resulting in an ever larger share of firm 
residuals.  
Reliance on so-called incentive alignment mechanisms for 
controlling agent opportunism has resulted in an exponential rise in 
total CEO compensation driven by use of equity forms of 
compensation. This increase in CEO pay comes in stark contrast to 
lesser growth exhibited by the economy, the average wages of 
employees and inflation in general (e.g., Bebchuk & Grinstein, 2005; 
Bogle, 2008; Deutsch, 2008; Frydman & Saks, 2010; Morgenson, 
2013; Walsh, 2008). That is, during the pursuit of a stronger 
association between pay and performance, CEOs have somehow 
captured an increasing share of firm residuals that is difficult to justify 
as optimal given that CEO pay remains largely insensitive to 
fluctuations in firm performance (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). The growing 
disparity between the increases in CEO pay and that of other segments 
of the economy raises issues about the roots of social inequality, in 
particular whether CEOs are receiving more than their fair share of 
firm residuals and what has allowed this to occur. Indeed, it would be 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Management, (June 4, 2014). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications. 
9 
 
difficult to justify on normative grounds having agents who are already 
highly paid to have greater access to residuals than investors who risk 
their capital in the firm and whom most agency scholars would agree 
represent the primary claimants to returns on their investment. All of 
these concerns are reflective of socially constructed norms regarding 
distributive justice between investors and executives of public 
companies.  
To understand how CEO pay has risen, we must consider the 
process by which CEO pay is determined. To do this we view CEO pay 
as the outcome of a bargaining process between the CEO and the 
board of directors. Thus, outcomes of this process are likely influenced 
by the ability and power of the CEO vis-à-vis representatives of the 
shareholders (i.e., board of directors) to extract value from the firm in 
the form of additional compensation. In other words, CEO 
compensation and rewards are the outcome of a bargaining process 
between the CEO and the board where the former would prefer more 
pay over less and less risk over more risk, while the latter would prefer 
to pay less and transfer some risk onto the agent. Typically the 
compromise between these opposing preferences has led to greater 
reliance on equity forms of pay and correspondingly an escalation in 
the overall amount paid to CEOs (e.g., Bebchuk, & Grinstein, 2005). 
Alternatively, if the CEO is not able to or does not know how to secure 
extra value for herself or himself, it is less likely that principals and the 
board of directors in particular will voluntarily award larger payments, 
which directly affect their own firm wealth (e.g., Williamson, 1985). 
This leads us to ask when and under what conditions either the CEO is 
able to extract greater amounts of wealth or the principals can 
constrain CEO rent seeking and limit the portion of firm residuals 
captured by the CEO. Viewing the relationship between CEOs and the 
board of directors (representing shareholders) as a battle over firm’s 
residuals (Williamson, 1985), we argue that two broad categories of 
factors—CEO structural power and governance structures—would 
make the CEO or the board more powerful and able to extract larger or 
smaller shares of firm residuals.  
Viewing CEO pay as the result of a bargaining process between 
parties who vary in their ability and power to influence the outcome 
focuses attention on the nature of this process and whether failures in 
procedural justice may help explain departures from distributive 
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justice. Specifically, procedural justice is a necessary precondition for 
distributive justice (Greenberg, 1990); hence examining factors that 
influence the process of allocating firm residuals among stakeholders, 
especially allocations to the CEO in the form of compensation, may 
help us better understand how violations of distributive justice might 
occur. Thus, we begin by examining for evidence of distributive justice 
failure by comparing CEO returns to those of shareholders, while also 
considering how factors influencing this process may violate issues of 
procedural justice.  
Distributive Justice Failure 
Distributive justice reflects the allocation of resources among 
members of a society and whether that allocation corresponds to 
socially shared beliefs about how those resources should be allocated. 
Different societies may hold different beliefs about what constitutes 
distributive justice. For example, some societies may accept a creed in 
which resources are allocated to people based on need, and from 
people based on ability (Marx, 1906), while others may favor a model 
of distribution based solely on merit (Smith, 1937). Within a capitalist 
system, owners of valuable assets (such as investors in a corporation) 
are traditionally given primary claimant rights to the residual value 
produced by those assets (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). Specifically, 
societies that view distributive justice through the lens of capitalism 
acknowledge that in exchange for their willingness to accept the risk 
that their investment may or may not provide a positive return, 
owners are granted primary claimant rights to firm residuals. This 
should be reflected in the returns they realize from their investment. 
This arrangement has positive benefits for society by encouraging 
investment in entrepreneurial ventures and thus the creation of new 
value that is ultimately distributed among all stakeholders.  
The tremendous success of this system has led to the separation 
of ownership from control due to a need to pool resources from 
multiple investors to continue developing and expanding value-
producing assets. Thus, dispersed owners hire agents to manage their 
investment making owners vulnerable to agent opportunism (Berle & 
Means, 1932). Though various mechanisms are employed to control 
agent opportunism, both empirical research and conventional wisdom 
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suggest that agents may be winning the battle with shareholders over 
the allocation of firm value. If true, this suggests a breakdown in the 
normative views of distributive justice regarding the socially accepted 
norm for allocating firm residual value between owners and agents. 
Specifically, if agents are capturing a larger portion of firm value than 
shareholders, even after compensating CEOs for their human capital 
investment (i.e., their reservation wages), this would appear prima 
facie evidence that traditional notions of resource allocation between 
agents and principals are being violated. Said formally,  
Hypothesis 1: The use of equity-based pay in CEO compensation results in 
CEOs realizing higher returns from equity than shareholders thus 
violating norms of distributive justice in the allocation of firm residuals 
between agents and principals.  
Procedural Justice Failure 
Procedural justice concerns the fairness in allocation processes 
(Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza, & Fry, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 
1975). This literature identifies six rules that are associated with the 
perceived fairness of allocation processes: consistency, bias 
suppression (including both the transparency and impartiality of the 
process), objectivity, diligence in addressing issues and taking 
corrective action if necessary, representation of the affected parties, 
and compliance with culturally accepted norms of fairness. These rules 
have been empirically demonstrated to influence perceptions of the 
fairness of allocation decisions and ultimately individual behavior, 
including the behavior of those not directly affected by the allocation 
process (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001). In the context 
of principal–agent relations, we contend that justice is served if the 
procedure for allocating firm residuals is consistent across agents and 
time, if no individual party is favored over others, if the allocation is 
based on accurate information and informed opinion, if there is due 
diligence among those responsible to make the allocation, if all 
stakeholders affected by the allocation are represented, and if cultural 
norms of fairness and equity are followed.  
A large literature indicates that when managers are in control of 
the firm they tend to pursue compensation policies that benefit them 
at the expense of atomistic owners (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; see also 
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Tosi et al., 1999, for review), and it is possible for powerful CEOs to 
take advantage of other principals due to their central position in 
allocating firm wealth among the various stakeholders. The potential 
for CEOs to leverage their position to capture a larger share of 
residuals would seem to violate the rule of bias suppression in 
procedural justice. As noted earlier, if CEO returns are in excess of 
shareholder returns, this would seem to be evidence of bias favoring 
the CEO in the allocation of firm residuals. Given that CEOs are already 
well paid for their human capital through a variety of perquisite and 
nonperquisite rewards, this bias would be difficult to justify from a 
normative perspective.  
An important discretionary factor likely to facilitate or hinder 
CEO’s accrual of excess returns is this individual’s structural power 
within the firm. Research by Hambrick and Cannella (2004) and 
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), among others, suggests that as the 
structural position of the CEO within the firm increases his or her 
influence over organizational decisions strengthens accordingly. While 
it is true that even powerful CEOs operate within the constraints of 
preexisting governance structures, they may enjoy disproportionate 
influence to tilt the balance in their favor when it comes to a sharing of 
firm residuals. Consistent with a social stratification view (Pfeffer, 
1981), we hypothesize that an important predictor of CEO relative 
returns is the power that resides in the top executive suite.  
Research on employee compensation and negotiation is clear 
that agents have their strongest bargaining power in negotiating their 
employment agreement at the time of their initial appointment when 
they enjoy greater freedom to walk away. For example, evidence 
suggests that outside CEO hires earn approximately 13% to 15.3% 
more than internal hires (Harris & Helfat, 1997; Murphy & Zabojnik, 
2004). Those being hired into the CEO position are most likely to take 
advantage of this situation for several reasons. First, new CEOs can 
take advantage of small numbers bargaining in which negotiation is 
restricted to a single partner. This is because boards generally 
negotiate with candidates sequentially, such that they negotiate with 
their preferred candidate and only when they cannot reach a mutually 
agreeable contract will they open negotiations with a second 
candidate. This approach clearly puts the candidate in a stronger 
position when negotiating compensation, and this stance would be 
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exaggerated further if she or he is currently employed elsewhere. 
Second, boards are likely to hold optimistic views about the potential 
contributions of a new CEO based on the candidate’s prior success. 
This optimism may inflate the value they initially attribute to the CEO’s 
human capital, thus justifying concessions to the CEO’s demands. 
Finally, both parties are generally represented by outside council or by 
consulting firms specializing in executive compensation. These 
representatives have access to compensation data from other firms 
that are used in supporting their demands. If boards have a strong 
interest in hiring the candidate, they are likely to concede to demands 
supported by data provided by the candidate’s representative.  
In sum, the negotiation of CEO compensation and thus the 
allocation of firm residuals between the CEO and shareholders appear 
to violate several features of procedural justice and may offer some 
explanation for violations of distributive justice in which shareholders 
take a backseat to CEOs. In the next section we suggest that 
bargaining between CEOs and the board of directors over the 
allocation of firm residuals is likely to change over time due to changes 
in the CEO’s structural power and the nature of governance structure 
employed to control agent opportunism.  
CEO Structural Power 
A long string of research has brought onto center stage the 
internal struggle among corporate actors who often scramble to 
pursue pluralistic goals even if this comes at the expense of other 
stakeholders (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Westphal & Graebner, 2010). The bargaining between an executive as 
agent and those representing the principal over allocation of firm 
residuals represents one such struggle (Coffee, 1988; Williamson, 
1985). Drawing on prior research, we outline two indicators of CEO 
structural power—CEO tenure and CEO duality.  
The dual nature of tenure in CEO structural power 
Prior research on CEO tenure offers inconclusive findings 
whether tenure garners higher or lower power to CEOs. In particular, 
while the literature on human capital and CEO obsolescence argues 
that longer tenure is associated with lower CEO power, the literature 
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on CEO entrenchment posits that longer-tenure CEOs enjoy greater 
power inside the firm. We suggest the reason for the lack in consistent 
findings is that two opposing factors affect the CEO’s power as CEO 
tenure increases: the decaying of the CEO’s human capital and their 
growing entrenchment in the position of CEO. The former corresponds 
to a weakening of power, while the latter enhances CEO power.  
As noted above, CEOs are likely to have very high relative 
bargaining power when initially hired. Barring continued success, the 
power of the CEO to act unilaterally may decline over time due to 
obsolescence. The CEO’s human capital may not fit with the firm or 
become stale and its quality deteriorate with a changing environment, 
leading to the choice of strategies that lack fit with the environment 
(Miller, 1991) and harm performance (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick, 
2006). In addition, the longer CEOs remain with a firm the more firm-
specific capital they will develop, which may have limited value to 
other firms. That is, long-tenured CEOs not only offer a smaller 
contribution to the firm’s success, but also have fewer employment 
alternatives given that their human capital increasingly lacks market 
value. From a bargaining perspective (e.g., Kim & Fragale, 2005; 
Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), the smaller the CEO’s contribution 
and the fewer alternative employment opportunities available due to 
their diminishing human capital, the lower the CEO’s power vis-à-vis 
the board. As a result, as tenure increases, CEO power declines due to 
increased obsolescence leading to lower CEO relative returns from the 
firm.  
The literature on CEO entrenchment argues for an opposite 
impact of CEO tenure. The longer CEOs stay in office, the more power 
they are able to garner (e.g., Hambrick & Fukutomi, 1991; Hill & Phan, 
1991). In particular, CEOs may increase their influence in the firm 
over time through a variety of tactics including ingratiating themselves 
with key constituents, manipulating and selecting board members, or 
establishing a strong record of performance (e.g., Mace, 1971; 
Westphal, 1998; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). These contributors to CEO 
power, often summarized as factors underlying CEO entrenchment, 
have been associated with increased opportunism (e.g., Combs & Skill, 
2003; Ocasio, 1994). Thus, over time CEOs could increase their power 
vis-à-vis the board and be able to request and receive larger shares of 
firm residuals.  
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We believe that these opposing perspectives combine to 
influence the power of CEOs over time. However, we posit that CEO 
obsolescence is more likely to affect CEO power early in the CEO’s 
tenure, while entrenchment is likely to counterbalance that effect later 
in the CEO’s tenure, resulting in a nonlinear association between 
power and CEO relative returns. This occurs because entrenchment 
effects require time to develop, while human capital may begin to 
decay early with changes in environmental conditions, performance 
consequences that fail to satisfy early expectations, or simply limits to 
the CEO’s ability to contribute. Thus, we would expect tenure will 
exhibit a negative association with CEO relative returns, but this 
association will shift toward a positive association in later years as the 
CEO’s deepening entrenchment reverses her or his declining power. 
Thus, we propose a convex relationship between CEO tenure and CEO 
relative returns where the latter will decrease at a diminishing rate 
with increases in CEO tenure:  
Hypothesis 2: CEO tenure exhibits a U-shaped association with CEO relative 
returns such that CEO returns relative to shareholder returns decrease 
initially over time, but later rise due to increasing entrenchment.  
CEO duality as a violation of procedural justice 
Another indicator of CEO structural power and thus a threat to 
bias suppression in the allocation process is when a CEO also occupies 
the position of board chairman. In general, duality renders more power 
to the CEOs and weakens the ability of the board to challenge and 
oversee the CEO (e.g., Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). A CEO who also 
presides over the board of directors has enormous power over 
directors and could influence the agenda, deliberations, and decisions 
in the boardroom (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). As a result, not only 
can a CEO chair filter information to the board, but also she or he 
could represent excess CEO returns as appropriate and justified. Prior 
research also suggests that “CEOs who serve as board chairs gain 
influence over board member nominations, compensation setting, 
board agendas, and so forth, even if they do not formally serve on the 
committees charged with those responsibilities” (O’Connor, Priem, 
Coombs, & Gilley, 2006: 487), which ultimately undermines board 
monitoring (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & 
Bierman, 2010) and reduces the ability and motivation of directors to 
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constrain the CEO rent seeking. Overall, the existence of duality 
should allow CEOs to more easily capture a larger portion of firm 
residuals, and violates a rule of procedural justice, notably the 
requirement of impartiality as reflected in suppression. Thus,  
Hypothesis 3: CEO duality exhibits a positive association with CEO relative 
returns compared to shareholder returns.  
Governance Structures 
Boards of directors play a key role in determining CEO compensation, 
given their formal authority to negotiate with CEOs over distribution of 
the firm’s joint outputs (e.g., Williamson, 1985). That is, boards 
negotiate with CEOs over pay amount and pay design, such as the 
amount of pay linked to achievement of firm outcomes important to 
shareholders. Linking pay to firm performance is thought to increase 
incentive alignment between agents and principals (see Murphy, 1999, 
for a survey of CEO compensation and agency contracting) and is 
argued to be a desirable mechanism for protection of shareholder 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Assuming that agent self-
interests are likely to diverge from those of shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), it then follows that the preferences of the two 
negotiating parties diverge. The resulting balance among these 
competing interests is likely to be a function of the effort each side 
puts into negotiating on their own behalf. Though CEOs clearly are 
motivated to bargain for more pay and less risk since they benefit 
directly from winning in these negotiations, it is less clear how much 
incentive boards have in tempering CEO desires.  
Board Diligence 
Agency theorists have long argued that the board should be 
independent if it is to diligently perform its monitoring and reward 
functions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). From a procedural perspective this 
should result in an allocation of residuals that reflects normative views 
of distributive justice. Furthermore, there is a strong tradition 
emanating from the human resource management literature that there 
should be some emotional distance and lack of vested interests 
between those who judge and those being judged (Eccles, 1985). This 
view rests on arguments that the appraisal of individual merit and 
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judgment of pay deservingness demand some reasonable degree of 
objectivity in the assessment process even though validity and 
reliability of evaluation results will never be perfect (e.g., Milkovich, 
Newman, & Gerhart, 2013).  
Building on this view there has been considerable though largely 
unsuccessful effort at empirically linking board independence as 
reflected in the proportion of outside directors to the control of agency 
costs (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Dalton et al., 
1998). A primary reason for the failure of board independence to 
demonstrate a strong role in controlling agency costs is suggested by 
the sociopolitical perspective of corporate governance, which highlights 
how top executives seek to manage the impressions of external 
constituents about governance structures, policies, and procedures 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). According 
to this view, self-serving CEOs can enhance the legitimacy of high 
compensation packages with limited risk by demonstrating conformity 
to the prevailing ideologies or institutional forces by symbolically 
appointing more outside directors to the full board who share strong 
social ties with them. External constituents, the media, and 
governance scholars, observing formally independent boards with a 
high level of structural legitimacy, may erroneously assume that such 
a board will also have higher process legitimacy to effectively control 
managerial self-interest (Suchman, 1995). In the words of Westphal 
and Graebner (2010: 16) “powerful leaders can give the impression of 
enhancing the board’s control capacity, without actually increasing its 
propensity to exercise control, by making changes in board 
composition that increase the board’s formal independence from 
management without increasing (or even decreasing) its social 
independence.” Thus, board independence has generally failed to 
reflect the underlying motivations of board members in controlling CEO 
opportunism. In other words, from a procedural justice perspective 
stacking a board of directors with members who exhibit economic 
independence but who share strong social ties to the CEO raises 
questions about the ability of the board to adequately represent the 
interests of shareholders.  
To capture the board’s incentive to control agency costs when 
bargaining over firm residuals with the CEO, we propose to examine 
board diligence defined as the degree of director motivation and ability 
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in fulfilling board responsibilities. Focusing on board diligence avoids 
equating structural characteristics of the board, such as economic 
independence, with the board’s motivation as has been done in some 
prior research where the concept of vigilance has been subsumed 
within board independence (e.g., Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008). 
Thus, we suggest that from a procedural perspective board diligence 
represents a crucial factor in assessing the degree to which boards 
make a fair allocation of firm residuals and thus avoid situations where 
CEO returns exceed those of shareholders. Assuming boards are 
charged with representing the interests of shareholders when 
negotiating the CEO’s pay package, linking board diligence to CEO 
relative returns should indicate the degree to which interests of 
shareholders are adequately represented in this allocation decision.  
From an agency theoretic perspective board diligence is 
associated with the motivation of board members to control agency 
costs and their motivation is likely strong with the amount of equity 
they own in the firm. As a result, they are less likely to bequeath a 
larger share of residuals to the CEO since these residuals would come 
at their expense due to the fact of directors being partial owners in the 
firm. That is, board equity makes the board a residual claimant and 
thus engenders greater motivation on the part of directors as 
principals to prevent CEOs from obtaining a larger share than they 
receive (Dalton, Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003). Alternatively, 
director equity ownership encourages the board to be more diligent in 
its fiduciary duties and to stay more cautious toward the CEO’s 
outwardly aggressive or obvious rent-seeking behavior. In other 
words, when the board is properly motivated to represent shareholder 
interests, we would expect that CEO opportunism in the form of CEO 
relative returns is more likely constrained.  
In addition, board diligence is also related to the ability of 
directors to constrain CEO opportunism. Such ability likely depends on 
the level of director attendance at board meetings. Regular attendance 
at board meetings should provide directors with detailed information 
on the CEO’s intentions and efforts as well as offering them more 
thorough knowledge for accurately evaluating the CEO, conducting 
proper monitoring, and fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the firm. If 
directors miss many board meetings, the CEO is more likely to take 
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advantage of their absence to extract larger returns. This logic leads to 
our fourth hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: Board member diligence exhibits a negative association with 
CEO relative returns compared to shareholder returns.  
Method 
Sample and Data 
Data for this study were drawn from several sources: financial 
data from Compustat, executive compensation data from Execucomp, 
and board-level data from Bloomberg, Risk Metrics, and Corporate 
Library’s Historical Data. Our data were collected for the years 2001 
through 2008. This resulted in a final sample size of 2,864 individual 
CEO-year observations for testing our hypothesized relationships.  
Dependent Variable 
CEO relative returns 
We define CEO relative returns as returns on CEO equity-based 
compensation relative to shareholder returns. CEO returns in excess of 
shareholder returns after controlling for other forms of CEO pay would 
seem to represent a failure of normative views of distributive justice in 
which shareholders presumably are the primary claimants of firm 
residuals (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001). Analogous to the 
shareholder wealth maximization goal of incentive alignment, we 
compare CEO returns to shareholder returns as proxy for assessing the 
allocation of firm residuals between agents and principals. To create 
our measure of CEO relative returns, we first measured the annual 
change in CEO wealth resulting from contingent pay (producing CEO 
returns) and regressed this measure on annual shareholder returns 
controlling for CEO turnover, firm size, firm performance, and firm 
risk. A full description of how this measure was calculated can be 
found in the appendix. The latter variables control for human capital 
and personal risk factors that are not shared by shareholders (see 
Table 1 for descriptive statistics). This regression model is used to test 
Hypothesis 1. In essence, this approach allows us to directly compare 
the annual returns accrued by CEOs on their equity holdings (including 
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changes in the intrinsic value of stock options) to the returns that 
shareholders receive on their equity holdings (including dividends). In 
general, a regression coefficient on shareholder returns larger than 1 
would indicate that CEOs are capturing a larger share of firm residuals 
than shareholders. Results from this procedure are presented in Table 
2.  
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We use the residuals from the model above as our DV in testing 
Hypotheses 2 to 4.1 Essentially, our DV (CEO relative returns) 
represents the amount of unexplained movement in CEO returns 
relative to shareholder returns and firm performance. Similar approach 
has been utilized in prior research focusing on whether CEOs receive 
appropriate pay and whether their pay reflects objective economic and 
organizational conditions (e.g., Fong, Misangyi, & Tosi, 2010; Wade, 
O’Reilly, & Pollock, 2006). Our approach is methodologically preferable 
to creating a difference variable that subtracts shareholder returns 
from CEO returns. Difference variables have been criticized for 
producing problems of interpretation as well as potentially biasing 
associations (Edwards, 1996; Wiseman, 2009). Furthermore, we avoid 
using a ratio of CEO returns to shareholder returns (cf. Nyberg et al., 
2010) because our purpose is to examine whether and why CEOs 
extract a greater share of residuals than shareholders; a regression 
approach allows us to appropriately capture the core construct of CEO 
relative returns.  
Independent Variables 
CEO tenure (Hypothesis 2) reflects the relative structural power 
of the CEO in the company. CEO tenure is measured as the number of 
years the CEO has been in office (e.g., Henderson et al., 2006).  
CEO duality (Hypothesis 3) is measured as 1 if the CEO and 
board chairman positions are held by the same person and 0 otherwise 
(Boyd, 1995).2 
Board diligence (Hypothesis 4) is represented by board 
incentives and board attendance. Board incentives is calculated as the 
proportion of equity-based pay to total director pay received by board 
members (Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011). Board attendance is 
calculated first as the number of directors who have missed at least 
75% of annual meetings (Risk Metrics, 2013). This variable is then 
reverse coded so that, like with board incentives, higher values 
correspond to higher levels of diligence.  
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Control Variables 
We control for several factors that provide additional indicators 
of governance control over agency costs including institutional 
ownership, board independence, board size, and board meetings. 
Institutional ownership is modeled as a dummy variable that is coded 
1 if there exists at least one owner with a large ownership position, 
and 0 if not. Prior research argues that institutional investors are “a 
store of potential influence” (Pfeffer, 1981: 52) and serve to align the 
interests of agents and principals (Dalton et al., 2003). Board 
independence is the percentage of board members who are classified 
as neither “inside” nor “related outside,” where related outside is 
defined as board members with economic ties to the firm (e.g., 
bankers, suppliers) outside of their position on the board of directors 
(Dalton et al., 1998). The correlation between board incentives and full 
board independence is –.002, and the correlation between board 
attendance and full board independence is .01, indicating that these 
dimensions are distinct from one another (see correlation matrix, 
Table 3). Board size represents the total number of members serving 
on the firm’s corporate board (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999). 
Board meetings is the total number of meetings held annually. The 
more meetings held by the board, the more information board 
members are likely to consider and more involved they appear to be in 
the firm’s affairs. However, board meetings may also reflect serious 
problems facing the firm requiring frequent meetings. Hence, while it 
is an important control, its interpretation is less clear.  
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In addition, we control for factors likely to influence CEO 
compensation including the proportion of CEO variable pay, average 
CEO peer compensation, the gap between CEO pay and that of other 
officers of the company, firm performance volatility, and annual 
performance. CEO variable pay is measured by calculating the 
proportion of noncash contingent pay as a percentage of total 
compensation to focus on long-term variable pay. We excluded cash 
bonuses because prior research suggests that this form of contingent 
pay is less variable over time (Larraza-Kintana, Wiseman, Gomez-
Mejia, & Welbourne, 2007) and may in fact be used to avoid tax 
penalties that accrue when base salary exceeds one million dollars per 
annum. Peer pay reflects the pay of peer CEOs in the industry and is 
included to capture labor market influences on the focal CEO’s pay 
(David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 1998). Peer pay is calculated as the 
average total compensation for CEOs in a three-digit NAICS industry 
code excluding the focal CEO. We also controlled for the difference in 
pay between the CEO and the next level of executives or what is 
termed as pay gap. Pay gap is measured as the percentage difference 
in total compensation between the CEO and the second-highest-paid 
executive. Performance volatility represents firm risk and as volatility 
increases CEOs require an additional risk premium to agree to work for 
a riskier firm (cf. Shavell, 1979). This variable is measured as the 60-
month moving average of stock price volatility (Bekaert, Harvey, 
Lundblad, & Siegel, 2007). Firm performance is measured as firm 
return on assets and accounts for business cycle effects. Drawing on 
prior research we control for CEO age as a proxy for experience 
(Cannella & Shen, 2001). Firm size is measured as the logarithm of 
firm sales to control for size effects known to explain a large portion of 
the variance in CEO pay (Tosi et al., 2000). CEO turnover is a dummy 
variable that is coded 1 for years there was a change in the position of 
CEO and 0 otherwise. We also include year dummies to account for 
time effects.  
To limit the effect of extreme outliers, the measures of peer 
pay, board meetings, pay gap, performance volatility, board 
incentives, and board attendance are winsorized at the 99 percentile 
(Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; McNamara, Haleblian, & 
Dykes, 2008). We checked the variance inflation factors, and none of 
them was larger than 4.71, indicating no multicollinearity issues. 
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Finally, with the exception of shareholder returns all independent and 
control variables were lagged at period t-1.  
Estimation Procedures 
The data for our study consists of yearly observations of CEO 
and firm variables. Thus, it is a panel data model that prevents us 
from using ordinary least squares regression (e.g., Bliese, 2000; 
Devers, McNamara, Wiseman, & Arrfelt, 2008). In addition, our panel 
consists of multiple cross-sectional units and very few time periods per 
unit. To properly address the specificities of our data, we utilize the 
Arellano–Bond generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation 
method (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Roodman, 2006). This method 
provides several advantages. First, Arellano–Bond provides a very 
robust estimation and is preferred for autoregressive-distributed lag 
panel data sets with multiple cross-sectional units and few time 
periods. Second, while inclusion of a lagged value of the dependent 
variable allows us to control for the impact of prior CEO relative 
returns on future CEO relative returns, the lagged dependent variable 
is likely to be correlated with the error term (Greene, 2000). Such a 
problem is avoided in Arellano–Bond GMM estimation. Third, panel 
data are often subject to autocorrelation, which is also likely in our 
sample (using the Wooldridge test we rejected the null hypothesis of 
no serial autocorrelation). Arellano–Bond estimation effectively 
addresses such concerns. In addition, Arellano–Bond addresses issues 
of heteroscedasticity usually present in panel data sets (Arellano, 
2003). Finally, the potential endogeneity of the independent variables 
is accounted for by including their lagged values as instruments.  
For our sample we relied on Arellano–Bond estimation utilizing 
System GMM estimator which increases efficiency and reduces bias 
(Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998). In addition, System 
GMM is preferable to Difference GMM estimator because “the 
persistence of the dependent . . . variable could cause severe weak 
instrument problems in Difference GMM models” (Uotila, Maula, Keil, & 
Zahra, 2009: 226). We utilize GMM with orthogonal deviations because 
our data panel is unbalanced (Alessandri, Tong, & Reuer, 2012; 
Arellano & Bover, 1995; Roodman, 2006). In addition, we used a two-
step estimator with robust standard errors and a two-lag structure of 
the instruments to deal with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Management, (June 4, 2014). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications. 
25 
 
(e.g., Alessandri et al., 2012; Dokko & Gaba, 2012). Results showed 
that the two-lag structure successfully eliminates autocorrelation 
problems. We tested the possibility of endogeneity of some of our 
variables by including instruments, which represent lagged values of 
those variables. Including lagged values of CEO relative returns, pay 
gap, tenure, and duality provided consistent results with the ones 
reported in the article, which increases the credibility and confidence in 
the approach we applied. As a robustness test, we also ran our 
analyses with orthogonal deviations and without orthogonal deviations, 
with and without robust standard errors, with a two-step and single-
step estimator, with two-, three-, and four-lag structure. Overall, 
results are consistent with those reported in the current article.3 
In Tables 2 and 4 we report the Hansen statistic and the tests 
for autocorrelation. Results indicate that instruments are valid and not 
correlated with the error terms (Lim & McCann, 2013; Vandaie & 
Zaheer, 2014) and there is no evidence of autocorrelation.  
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Results 
Before presenting our results for Hypotheses 2 to 4, we would 
like to stress that positive (negative) correlation between our 
independent variables and our dependent variable indicates that CEOs 
are able to capture larger (smaller) share of firm residuals than 
shareholders. Tables 1 and 3 provide descriptive statistics and 
correlations for the variables in our model.  
Table 2 provides results from regressing CEO returns on 
shareholder returns and other factors and serves to test Hypothesis 1. 
The relationship between shareholder returns and CEO returns has a 
parameter value of 1.295 (p < .001), indicating that for every unit 
increase in shareholder returns, CEO returns increase an additional 
29.5% more than shareholder returns. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is strongly 
supported.  
Meanwhile, firm size has a positive influence on the size of CEO 
returns, while firm performance has a negative influence. This latter 
finding provides some support that CEOs are able to partially insulate 
their income from shifts in firm performance.  
Table 4 provides the results for our Hypotheses 2 to 4. Model 1 
of Table 4 includes only the control variables. The majority of our 
control variables are not significant, with several exceptions. The 
negative association between CEO age and CEO returns indicates that 
younger (and probably less wealthy) CEOs are more likely to extract 
higher returns from the firm than shareholders. Institutional ownership 
is significant suggesting that the presence of large institutional 
investors constrains CEOs in capturing larger returns. The positive 
association between board independence and CEO relative returns 
provides support for the sociopolitical view that board member 
economic independence masks social ties to the CEO that can 
undermine board efforts to control CEO opportunism (Westphal & 
Stern, 2006).  
Models 2 to 6 of Table 4 add our primary variables of interest. 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that CEO relative returns will decrease as CEO 
tenure increases, but that this decrease in relative returns will occur at 
a decreasing rate. In support of Hypothesis 2, we find that CEO tenure 
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has a negative main effect (p < .001), while tenure squared has a 
positive association (p < .001). The convex relationship is presented in 
Figure 1. Hypothesis 3 predicts a positive association between CEO 
duality and CEO relative returns. The coefficient in Model 4 is 
negatively correlated (p < .05) with CEO relative returns indicating 
that when a CEO is also the chairperson of the board, she or he 
realizes less excessive returns. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. 
Hypothesis 4 predicts that board diligence should constrain CEO 
relative returns. Results support this prediction: In particular, we find 
a significant negative association (p < .01) between board incentives 
and CEO relative returns and a significant negative correlation (p 
< .05) between director attendance and CEO relative returns. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
Figure 1. Relationship Between CEO Tenure and CEO Relative Returns 
 
Discussion 
In this study we have argued and empirically demonstrated that 
when enabling conditions exist, CEOs are able to take advantage of 
them and capture a larger share of firm residuals than shareholders. 
That is, norms of distributive justice that place shareholders front and 
center in the allocation of firm residuals are more likely to be violated 
when there is evidence of weak procedural justice in corporate 
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governance. In particular, CEOs capture higher returns when they 
have greater power and those returns are less susceptible to firm 
performance fluctuations earlier in their tenure when CEOs’ value to 
the firm is likely highest. Conversely, they are able to reduce any loss 
of power due to obsolescence of their human capital by developing and 
strengthening social ties to board members. Stated in a different way, 
under these enabling conditions CEOs are better able to extract 
personal gain by decoupling their equity-based returns from those of 
shareholders. Thus, despite the push for tying CEO pay to firm 
performance through equity forms of compensation, CEOs have 
captured an increasing share of firm residuals relative to shareholders 
while simultaneously insulating their firm-specific wealth from 
fluctuations in firm value. This finding corresponds to the view that 
CEOs hold managerial power over boards that set their compensation 
and use that power to increase the portion of firm residuals they 
extract from the firm (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). That CEOs realize 
greater returns than shareholders, who presumably have primacy in 
claiming rights to residuals (Hansmann & Kraakman, 2001), supports 
charges that CEO compensation violates normative views of 
distributive justice (Bogle, 2008; Walsh, 2008).  
With regard to the role of the board of directors, we encounter a 
much more nuanced picture. Though we offered no prediction 
concerning full board independence, we find that it exhibits a positive 
association with CEO relative returns. In other words, the more 
outsiders on the board the more likely CEOs will negotiate for more 
income at lower risk. This finding corresponds to arguments that a 
focus on the degree of economic independence between board 
members and the firm masks social dynamics on the board that are 
often invisible to outside observers. In particular, research in the 
sociopolitical perspective of corporate governance highlights how top 
executives seek to manage the impressions of external constituents 
about governance structures, policies, and procedures (Westphal & 
Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). An effective way for self-
serving CEOs to enhance the legitimacy of high compensation 
packages with limited risk is to demonstrate conformity to the 
prevailing ideologies or institutional forces by symbolically appointing 
more outside directors to the full board who share strong social ties 
with them. External constituents and the media, observing formally 
independent boards with a high level of structural legitimacy, may 
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erroneously assume that such a board will also have higher procedural 
legitimacy to effectively control managerial self-interest (Suchman, 
1995). Essentially, a greater proportion of outside directors in the full 
board might simply represent a smoke screen or a “pretend” 
application of the theoretical agency logic of evaluator-evaluated 
independence when in fact there may well be collusion or a 
communality of interest between the board and CEO, such that CEOs 
are able to extract greater share of firm residuals.  
Justice Implications 
From a normative perspective, the presence of what we are 
calling CEO relative returns suggests that the allocation of firm 
residuals to CEOs is undeserved and thus represents a violation of 
distributive justice as well as an agency cost. Given that CEOs enjoy a 
larger share of firm residuals than do shareholders, and this share 
corresponds to strong bargaining power of the CEO matched with weak 
monitoring by the board, this would seem evidence of CEO rent-
seeking behavior and a “misappropriation” of shareholder wealth by 
the CEO. In other words, greater returns by CEOs vis-à-vis 
shareholders may be normatively construed as a manifestation of 
agent opportunism resulting in inequitable distributive justice, 
assuming that investors are the primary claimants of firm residuals. 
While there is no precise a priori point at which the allocation of firm 
residuals between CEO and shareholders is determined as optimal, it is 
clear that a growing segment of society, including shareholders using 
only anecdotal evidence, is questioning the justification of this 
allocation from a normative perspective. This study provides empirical 
evidence that CEOs are winning at the expense of shareholders. Still, 
defenders of compensation practices might argue that there is a 
positive motivational value when CEOs capture higher firm residuals 
since the size of the pie will be larger for all concerned (the proverbial 
“win-win” situation). For instance, the excess returns may offer an 
inducement to CEOs to increase effort, make better investment 
decisions, improve cost controls and the like which should improve 
subsequent firm performance. In a supplementary analysis, we did not 
find support for this view. More specifically, for the period 2001 to 
2008 we estimated how CEO relative returns relate to future firm 
performance. The association was negative but not statistically 
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significant suggesting that CEO relative returns do not coincide with 
increased firm performance; this finding supports our arguments that 
CEO relative returns represent a violation of distributive justice where 
CEOs capture a larger share of firm residuals compared to 
shareholders.  
We argued and found strong support that when directors are 
diligent (e.g., attend regularly board meetings and have strong 
incentives to monitor CEOs due to their own incentive pay 
arrangements), they are more likely to exercise their control function 
and thus constrain CEO relative returns. In other words, in addition to 
regular board attendance an important condition to secure directors’ 
effective oversight is to make them partial owners in the firm and tie 
part of their compensation to the fortunes of that firm. This suggests a 
hierarchy of incentive alignment emerges, such that incentive 
alignment between board members and shareholders results in greater 
alignment between CEOs and shareholders.  
We also found results that are opposite to our theorizing. In 
particular, rather than increasing CEO relative returns, duality 
decreased the amount of firm residuals captured by CEOs. We believe 
that the sociopolitical perspective could explain these findings. A savvy 
CEO, knowing the prevailing social norms and expectations for reduced 
CEO power, could voluntarily give the appearance of self-sacrificing 
power and influence to the board by avoiding the position of CEO-
chair. While the separation of the CEO and chairman positions helps 
gain external legitimacy, a CEO could still leverage her or his social 
ties and friendship connections with board members to gain larger 
relative returns (e.g., Westphal & Stern, 2006). In other words, abuse 
of power would be too obvious for a CEO-chair to receive higher 
returns, and hence one way to prevent that inference is to limit those 
returns. It might also be the case that boards may appoint CEO-chairs 
when the board believes that the CEO will not do things that 
compromise the perceived ethicality of the board (for instance, by 
securing egregious compensation). This represents an interesting area 
for future research.  
Finally, our study only focuses on the conditions that allow CEOs 
to gain returns from equity-based contingent compensation. This 
allowed us to avoid contaminating our measure of CEO returns with 
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compensation that is not shared by investors (such as base salary, 
other compensation, severance pay, and nonpecuniary forms of 
compensation). These forms have been argued to provide the risk 
premium that CEOs may demand as their reservation wage to accept 
the increased risk bearing that incentive alignment creates. Future 
research should consider whether this argument is justified. In 
addition, we were unable to capture the behavior of shareholders 
directly leaving this as a possible avenue for future research.  
Future research may also consider the role of board committees 
separately from the full board, such as the compensation committee. 
We believe that compensation committees may be in a better position 
to constrain CEO opportunism. In particular, because functional board 
committees are (a) more subject to direct regulatory institutional 
pressures (Scott, 2008), more subject to closer scrutiny by outside 
agencies, and bound by strong professional norms and codes of ethics 
(such as accredited compensation experts who are members of the 
Society for Human Resource Management) and (b) expected to 
perform much more focused, explicit, and unambiguous tasks, 
generally requiring highly specialized skills; securing social as well as 
economic independence of those committees could provide stronger 
protection of shareholder interests.  
Conclusion 
In this study we present a framework that offers new insight 
into CEO compensation and returns and which provides an innovative 
approach to represent CEO returns as a portion of overall firm 
residuals. More specifically, we use shareholder returns as an 
appropriate referent for gauging whether CEO returns satisfy one 
normative view of distributive justice. We find that CEOs capture a 
larger share of firm residuals, which appears to be facilitated by 
leverage over the board of directors and factors suggesting that 
violations of normative views of distributive justice can be traced to 
violations of rules for procedural justice. Thus, the resulting bargaining 
between CEOs and boards over CEO pay raises questions about both 
distributive and procedural justice issues in negotiating CEO pay.  
As a final point, our theoretical arguments and findings are not 
meant to imply that the core predictions of agency theory are not 
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supported. The reader should be reminded that agency theory has 
been criticized in the past for painting a bleak picture of human nature 
where selfishness and opportunism, much like the biblical original sin, 
are taken as given (Bruce, Buck, & Main, 2005; Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997).4 In this study we take a slightly different angle on 
executive compensation and contend that to better understand it we 
need to consider the complex interactions and objectives of principals 
and agents. While principals strive to better align agent interests with 
their own by attempting to align incentives of CEOs to those of 
investors, CEOs look for additional compensation to accept such 
bargains, while also insulating themselves from the risks associated 
with incentive alignment contracts. Our point is that in bargaining over 
the allocation of residuals in pursuit of strong pay-performance 
sensitivity various facilitating or constraining conditions tilt the balance 
of power between principals and agents to capture larger share of firm 
residuals, and result in violations of normative views of distributive 
justice. That is, we need to look beyond pay-performance sensitivity to 
the allocation of residuals and the procedures used in making that 
allocation.  
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Appendix 
Detailed Calculation of CEO Relative Returns 
Drawing on Nyberg and colleagues (2010), we calculated both 
CEO returns and shareholder returns as ratios. For CEO returns, the 
numerator equals the sum of cash bonuses, long-term incentive 
payouts, the value realized from the sale of company stock, and 
changes in the value of all equity-based components held until the end 
of the fiscal year (e.g., stock options, restricted stock, and ownership). 
This approach allows us to include the appreciation in value of all 
shares not sold during the entire period, the change in intrinsic value 
of all exercisable and nonexercisable options held at the beginning of 
the period, the value realized from any equity ownership sold during 
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the period, and the value realized from exercising options and selling 
the resulting stock during the period. The denominator of CEO returns 
includes CEO wealth at the beginning of the year (e.g., stock, 
restricted stock, vested stock, and stock options).  
We excluded salary and “other annual” compensation because 
they are not related to performance, generally reflect the reservation 
wages paid to CEOs, and are not available to shareholders. Thus, our 
measure of CEO returns provides a more conservative test of our 
predictions regarding CEO relative returns. In supplemental analyses, 
we conducted two robustness tests where we included (a) all 
nonvariable forms of CEO pay and (b) only variable forms of CEO pay 
in our measure of CEO returns, but we found no change in our 
findings.  
We calculated CEO returns as CEO income from variable pay 
during the year divided by CEO firm-specific wealth at the beginning of 
the year,  
 
where CEO variable pay incomet = bonust + LTIPt + change in value of 
unexercised unexercisable and exercisable optionst + change in value 
of restricted and vested stockt + change in the value of CEO equityt + 
value realized from exercised optionst.  
CEO beginning value variable pay wealthto = beginning value of 
CEO equityto + beginning value of restricted and vested stockto + 
beginning value of unexercised unexercisable and exercisable 
optionsto.  
Shareholder returns are calculated in a similar fashion to CEO 
returns by creating a ratio of the change in share price over the period 
plus dividends paid during the period, and then divided by the share 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year (Yermack, 2006).  
CEO returns and shareholder returns were then transformed 
through an inverse hyperbolic sine function (HIS): 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Management, (June 4, 2014). DOI. This article is © SAGE Publications and permission has been granted for this 
version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. SAGE Publications does not grant permission for this article to be further 
copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from SAGE Publications. 
34 
 
sinh – 1(x) = log(x + (x2 + 1)½) 
We employed the HIS transformation of our returns measures to 
reduce the effect of extreme outliers on our model, and to overcome 
issues related to negative values (Burbidge, Magee, & Robb, 1988; 
Nyberg et al., 2010).  
Notes 
1.  Following the suggestions of an anonymous reviewer, we conducted a 
supplementary test of our hypotheses. In particular, we used CEO returns 
as our DV and included shareholder returns as a control variable plus the 
rest of the control and independent variables. Results from this approach 
are consistent with those we report in this article and are available from 
the authors upon request.  
2.  Recently, Gove and Junkunc (2013) published a study that examines the 
problems with the duality measure. They point out that prior tests 
involving duality have produced inconsistent results leading to a debate 
over its meaning. As they suggest, the problem with this measure rests 
on an assumption of temporal consistency, which they show lacks 
empirical validity. Following their recommendations, we conducted a 
robustness check with an alternative measurement of duality. In 
particular, we identified instances when duality reflected a temporary 
event that would not reflect a lasting change in the CEO’s bargaining 
power relative to the board. For example, duality is unlikely to give the 
CEO lasting bargaining power over the board, if it is created only to assist 
in the transition of a CEO to the director position while a successor to the 
CEO is hired. Thus, in instances where duality lasted no more than two 
periods, we set those observations to zero indicating no duality. This 
adjustment to the duality measure produced similar results.  
3.  To provide additional robustness checks and comparability with 
estimation techniques in prior studies, we also ran our analyses via 
generalized least squared estimators with autocorrelation controls 
(Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), generalized estimating equations (e.g., 
Sanders & Hambrick, 2007), and hierarchical linear modeling. Results 
across all these estimation techniques were the same and are available 
from the authors.  
4.  See Gomez-Mejia, Wiseman, and Johnson-Dykes (2005) for a contrasting 
view.  
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